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INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining, an element of the criminal justice system since the
1800s, has become increasingly central to criminal proceedings over the
past forty years. In Argersinger v. Hamlin, the Supreme Court recognized
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the problems associated with the mass volume of cases in the legal system.1
The Court noted the resulting effects on overworked attorneys and judges,
as well as the pressure those case volumes put on attorneys to clear cases
from a docket without giving adequate attention to the defendant standing
before the court.2 These challenges have only increased in the years since,
and the practice of plea bargaining has become increasingly prevalent as an
effort to administer justice more fairly and efficiently.3 Nearly 95% of all
criminal cases in state court systems are resolved without going to trial, and
the percentage of pleas defendants enter in federal court is even higher.4 In
the majority opinion of Missouri v. Frye, Justice Anthony Kennedy
approvingly quoted two scholars who remarked that plea bargaining “is not
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system.”5 Many commentators have criticized plea bargaining, with some
calling for its abolition.6 Irrespective of their concerns, plea bargaining has
become entrenched in the criminal justice system, which depends on plea
bargaining at both the state and federal levels.7 Plea bargaining’s place in
the criminal justice system can be explained by its effectiveness in
efficiently resolving cases: it allows for cases to be resolved promptly,
which is all the more important when both prosecutors and defense
attorneys are assigned a significantly greater volume of cases than any one
attorney can competently manage. The Supreme Court has recognized plea
bargaining’s importance, enshrining its place in the system by denoting it as
1

407 U.S. 25, 34–36 (1972).
Id.
3
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012); see also Donald G. Gifford,
Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REV. 37, 37; Ana Maria Gutiérrez, Note, The Sixth Amendment: The Operation of
Plea Bargaining in Contemporary Criminal Procedure, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 695, 713
(2010).
4
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (tracing 94% of state court convictions and 97% of federal
court convictions back to guilty pleas).
5
Id. at 1407 (citing Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
6
See Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2299
(2006); John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining, How the Germans Do It, 78
MICH. L. REV. 204, 205 (1979) (arguing that the procedural safeguards built into the German
system effectively rendered plea bargains unnecessary in pre-unification West Germany,
demonstrating that plea bargaining is not inexorable); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1980 (1992) (arguing that plea agreements
undercut the interests of all parties involved, that incremental reforms are inadequate, and
that plea bargaining should be abolished completely).
7
Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, “Waiving” Goodbye to Rights: Plea
Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma of Competent Representation, 38 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1029, 1030 n.6 (2011); see also Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea
Bargaining in United States Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 717 (2006).
2
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a stage where a violation of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
effective counsel can result in habeas relief on the grounds of ineffective
counsel.8
The Supreme Court’s recent holdings in Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v.
Cooper clarify the specific nature of the relief available when a defense
attorney fails to communicate a plea bargain or gives defective legal advice,
encouraging a trial that results in a conviction and a significantly more
severe sentence than offered in a plea.9 In Frye and Lafler, the Supreme
Court reinstated plea offers after the defendants successfully claimed
ineffective assistance of counsel. The dissents in both cases predict that the
Court’s chosen remedy could result in further constitutional litigation with
respect to plea bargaining, and that rather than solving a problem, the Court
created a new field of litigation.10
This Comment explores the ripple effects that Frye and Lafler will
have on both prosecutors and defense attorneys, and the possibility that
reinstating plea offers will result in increased constitutional litigation. This
Comment argues that the holdings in Frye and Lafler supply a means for
encouraging prosecution-focused reform efforts and for curtailing practices
of overcharging defendants and using so-called exploding offers.
Legislative remedies should address the underfunding of both public
defender organizations and prosecutors.11 Future litigation should focus on
guaranteeing that plea offers remain available after first appearances.
Together, these efforts will ensure that defendants are able to exercise their
right to effective assistance of counsel.
Part I provides background information on the extension of the right to
counsel from the trial to other critical stages of criminal proceedings.
Specifically, it focuses on cases involving plea bargaining, as well as
seminal cases addressing ineffective assistance of counsel.
After
introducing these concepts, the Comment looks more carefully at Missouri
v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, in which the Supreme Court clarified the
remedy available to defendants granted habeas relief because of counsel
ineffectiveness during plea bargaining.
Part II focuses on several of the root causes of ineffective counsel,
namely overcriminalization, excessive caseloads, and the institutional
cultures of prosecutorial teams and public defender offices. These issues
8

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1399; Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1376 (2012).
10
See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
11
Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, Essay, The State (Never) Rests: How
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 261,
299–300 (2011).
9
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help explain the practices of overcharging defendants and extending
exploding offers, and the effects they have on agents within the emerging
plea bargaining market.
Part III charts several possible paths that litigation challenging these
practices could take, with an eye towards eventual reforms.12 Further, it
suggests the potential implications Frye and Lafler could have upon the
plea bargaining process. It looks first at how Frye and Lafler could directly
affect defense attorneys and prosecutors, and then it forecasts possible
litigation that could bring about specific reforms within the plea bargaining
process, such as some of the challenges mentioned in Part II.
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT CRITICAL STAGES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS

The Sixth Amendment guarantees assistance of counsel for those
accused of criminal offenses.13 Since the Amendment’s passage in the
eighteenth century, the doctrine of assistance of counsel has evolved to
accommodate developments within the criminal justice system14 and the
establishment of new forms of police procedure. As part of the
development of this area of law, the Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama
recognized that the rights of those accused of criminal offenses do not
attach only at trial and that deprivation of the right to counsel constitutes a
due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.15 Indeed, there are
earlier, critical stages of criminal proceedings during which the absence of
counsel could cause substantial prejudice to the accused, who thus has a
constitutional right to counsel at these stages.16
In Massiah v. United States, the Court held that when an indicted
defendant had retained counsel, government agents could not elicit
statements outside of counsel’s presence.17 The Court reversed Massiah’s
conviction on the grounds that the government improperly arranged a
meeting between the indicted defendant and a cooperative codefendant
12
The possibility of judicial reform follows from the Supreme Court’s recognition that
plea bargaining is central to the criminal justice system, as evidenced by its approving quote
of scholarly claims that plea bargaining, in fact, “is the criminal justice system.” Frye, 132
S. Ct. at 1407 (citing Scott & Stuntz, supra note 5, at 1912).
13
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
14
See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: A
National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1041–42 (2006).
15
287 U.S. 45, 70–71 (1932).
16
Id. at 57.
17
377 U.S. 201, 202–03, 206 (1964).
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during which the defendant made incriminating statements outside the
presence of counsel.18 Citing Powell v. Alabama, the Court noted that the
interval between arraignment and trial was “perhaps the most critical period
of the proceedings” and that the defendant had the right to assistance of
counsel in investigating the charged offense and preparing for trial.19 When
the government covertly elicited incriminating statements from an indicted
defendant who had obtained counsel, it violated this right.20
In United States v. Wade, the Court recognized the post-indictment
lineup as another such “critical” stage at which the accused required
counsel on account of the potential for police suggestivity.21 Such
suggestivity, the Court opined, could substantially damage the accused’s
chance of a fair trial, as an untrained citizen would be unable to detect
suggestivity without the assistance of counsel.22
In addition to guaranteeing defendants the right to counsel at certain
stages of criminal proceedings, the Court made clear in Gideon v.
Wainwright that the right to counsel applies in all criminal proceedings; the
Court held that the right to counsel, “fundamental and essential to a fair
trial,” applied in all courts, federal and state.23 The Court extended Gideon
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, emphasizing the necessity of counsel in all cases
where a guilty plea could result in imprisonment, including misdemeanor
cases with sentences under six months.24
B. PLEA BARGAINING AS A CRITICAL STAGE IN CRIMINAL LITIGATION

Plea bargaining involves a trade-off between defendants and
prosecutors, in which defendants agree to forego their constitutional right to
a jury trial and enter a guilty plea in exchange for more lenient sentencing
recommendations than would have been entered at trial.25 Research
indicates that these sentencing differentials play a significant role in
motivating the accused to plead guilty, particularly when they face the
prospect of mandatory minimum sentences after trial.26 In turn, prosecutors
18

Id.
Id. at 205.
20
Id. at 206.
21
388 U.S. 218, 223–24, 228 (1967).
22
Id. at 230, 236–37.
23
372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
24
407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972).
25
ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 44
(2007).
26
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 88 (2010) (noting how prosecutors stated
that mandatory minimums were valuable, not in and of themselves, but rather as bargaining
chips that enabled them to dispose of cases through plea agreements); see also Gifford,
19
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obtain convictions, are able to promptly impose punishment, and spare the
state the expenditure of resources involved in taking cases to trial.27
Prosecutors have discretion to bring whatever charges they can support with
probable cause, irrespective of whether these charges can all be proven at
trial beyond a reasonable doubt.28 When a case is overcharged, the accused
faces duplicate charges for single acts or crimes charged at higher degrees
than the evidence can reasonably support.29 Without ready access to police
reports, witnesses, and other evidence in the possession of the government,
the accused first learns of the charges, which carry significant potential
penalties, and any evidence the government chooses to disclose. Even
though Brady v. Maryland requires the prosecution to disclose any
favorable material information to the defendant,30 the Supreme Court has
not secured the defendant’s right to Brady material during plea bargaining.31
Given many defendants’ inexperience in evaluating plea offers and charges
brought against them, the need for defense counsel to provide accurate and
noncoercive advice is imperative.32 The importance of counsel at this stage
is evident when a plea-offer sentence is compared to a mandatory minimum
sentence for a series of charges that may be duplicative or overcharged.
Defense counsel is responsible for advising the client as to the value of the
offer and the strength of the prosecution’s evidence, as well as providing
information that will allow the client to make an informed and voluntary
decision as to whether to ultimately accept the offer.33

supra note 3, at 46. Gifford based his conclusion on an analysis of plea bargaining practices
in New York City, where those convicted after trial received sentences that were, on
average, twice as long as those who entered guilty pleas. Id.; see also DAVIS, supra note 25,
at 57; Moriarty & Main, supra note 7, at 1030. These more recent authors call attention to
the role that mandatory minimum sentences play in convincing the accused to forego trial.
27
See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
28
See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978); see also DAVIS, supra note
25, at 147; Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial
Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 862 (1995).
29
Albert Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50
85–86 (1968).
30
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
31
See generally Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Note, Plea Bargaining in the Dark: The
Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3599, 3614–29 (2013) (describing the circuit splits before and after United States v.
Ruiz as to the duty to disclose exculpatory and impeachment evidence during the plea
bargaining process).
32
Moriarty & Main, supra note 7, at 1045–46.
33
Id.; see also McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 469–70 (1969); Steven
Zeidman, To Plead or Not To Plead: Effective Assistance and Client-Centered Counseling,
39 B.C. L. REV. 841, 852 (1998).
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C. INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL CLAIMS RELATED TO PLEA
BARGAINING

Strickland v. Washington established a two-part test for habeas claims
based on ineffective assistance of counsel.34 Strickland’s two-part test
requires (1) a showing that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) a
showing that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.35
Shortly after Strickland, the Supreme Court soon heard its first habeas
petition claiming ineffective assistance in the plea-bargaining process. In
Hill v. Lockhart, the Supreme Court held that the two-part test could be
applied to habeas petitions arising out of attorney error during the plea
process.36 The Court found that the defendant in that case was not unduly
prejudiced by his counsel’s advice concerning his eligibility for parole.37
The Hill majority applied Strickland’s two-part test to “challenges to guilty
pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel,” opening the door for
habeas relief after negotiated guilty pleas.38
Since Hill, Strickland claims have been upheld in cases where counsel
encouraged a defendant to plead guilty without any investigation into the
defendant’s possible innocence or alibi,39 where an attorney failed to inform

34

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Id.
The Strickland Court emphasized that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s
performance must be highly deferential,” and that “a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance,” setting a high bar for habeas complainants to overcome. Id. at 689. The Padilla
Court recognized that “[s]urmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,” Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010), and empirical studies generally support this claim.
Amicus briefs filed in Frye and Lafler on behalf of both the petitioners and the respondents,
for example, cited to a study of habeas litigation in which a sample of 2,384 randomly
selected non-capital cases that contained 768 specific claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel had only one meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Brief
of National Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 19, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399 (2012) (Nos. 10-209 & 10-444) (citing NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL
REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS
CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, at 28, 52 (2007)).
36
474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).
37
Id. at 60. Justice Byron White’s concurrence suggests that counsel gave this advice based
on misinformation the defendant had provided concerning previous convictions. Id. at 61.
38
Id. at 58.
39
United States v. Rogers, 289 F. Supp. 726, 728–29 (D. Conn. 1968). Defense counsel
had strongly recommended a guilty plea after discounting the credibility of potential alibi
witnesses without attempting to contact them, and failed to qualify his recommendation by
stating that a guilty plea was only in the defendant’s best interests if the defendant was, in
fact, guilty. Id.
35
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a defendant of a plea offer,40 and where a conflict of interest prevented an
attorney from negotiating a favorable deal.41
In Padilla v. Kentucky, decided in 2010, the Supreme Court granted
relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel when a defense
attorney gave a noncitizen defendant incorrect advice about the collateral
consequences of pleading guilty, resulting in the defendant’s deportation.42
Padilla expanded the scope of an attorney’s duties in advising a client from
explaining only the sentence imposed by the trial court to include other
consequences of a guilty plea.43 Padilla has informed state court
determinations of exactly what this duty entails. For example, a Georgia
court held defense attorneys responsible for their failure to inform clients
that guilty pleas would subject them to sex offender registration
requirements.44 An Alabama court recognized a violation of the right to
effective counsel when counsel’s incorrect advice concerning the
availability of credit for time served resulted in the defendant taking a plea
that added five years to the time he believed he would serve.45 In Bauder v.
Florida Department of Corrections, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the grant
of habeas relief after counsel mistakenly advised a defendant that he would
not be subject to civil commitment proceedings when he pleaded no contest
to a charge of aggravated stalking of a minor.46 These cases indicate an
increasing awareness of the importance of correctly advising defendants
about the collateral consequences of conviction, whether they result from a
trial or a plea. Professor Stephanos Bibas explains that with Padilla:

40
Cottle v. State, 733 So. 2d 963, 964, 969 (Fla. 1999) (failing to communicate a plea
offer that could have resulted in parole or early release); People v. Whitfield, 239 N.E.2d
850, 851 (Ill. 1968) (failing to communicate an offer to reduce charges from murder to
manslaughter until after bench trial conviction); Ross, supra note 7, at 721 (citing Cottle).
41
Ruffin v. Kemp, 767 F.2d 748, 749 (11th Cir. 1985); see also Ross, supra note 7, at
721 (discussing counsel’s attempt to work out a plea agreement in which one of his clients
would testify against the other).
42
130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). Padilla, a permanent U.S resident, pleaded guilty to
three drug-related charges in exchange for a ten-year sentence and was advised not to worry
about immigration-related consequences, even though he pleaded guilty to deportable
offenses. Id.
43
See Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOWARD L.J. 675, 675–76 (2011).
44
Taylor v. State, 698 S.E.2d 384, 388 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010) (discussing how an
individual eventually won ineffective counsel relief after he was not advised that he would
be required to register as a sex offender when he pleaded guilty to two counts of child
molestation and only learned of this when he met his probation officer two years later).
45
Stith v. State, 76 So. 3d 286, 293 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
46
619 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2010).
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[T]he Court began to move beyond its fixation upon the handful of cases that go to
jury trials. It recognized that the other 95 percent of adjudicated cases resolved by
guilty pleas matter greatly, and began in earnest to regulate plea bargains the way it
has long regulated jury trials.47

D. REMEDYING INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL IN PLEA BARGAINING CASES

Up until the decisions in Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, the
circuit courts split over the question of whether plea bargaining was a
critical stage, as well as the appropriate remedy for successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claims based on deficient plea-bargaining
performances. For instance, in Williams v. Jones, the Tenth Circuit held
that plea bargaining was a critical stage and that counsel was ineffective
when he dissuaded a defendant from accepting a plea offer when the
defendant was willing to accept a ten-year sentence for second-degree
murder.48 Williams’s attorney believed Williams was innocent and
threatened to withdraw if he accepted the offer, which would have left
Williams without counsel.49 At trial, the jury found Williams guilty of firstdegree murder, and the court sentenced him to life without parole.50 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld Williams’s claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel and held that even though Williams received a fair trial, deficient
counsel substantially prejudiced him.51 The Tenth Circuit declined to
decide whether to reinstate the plea offer or to offer Williams a new trial
and instructed the district court to exercise discretion on remand.52
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Springs held that
subpar assistance in plea bargaining could not establish prejudice under
Strickland and that a defendant was entitled to a fair trial under the law, but
not to a discounted sentence secured through plea bargaining.53 Thus, as of
2011, defendants could receive three possible remedies when courts granted
their habeas petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel during the
plea-bargaining process: no remedy, specific performance of the offered

47

Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1118–19 (2011).
48
571 F.3d 1086, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1091.
52
Id. at 1094. On remand, the district court granted the habeas petition and released
Williams from custody, giving him credit for time served while leaving the first-degree
murder conviction intact. Williams v. Jones, No. CIV 03-201-RAW-KEW, 2010 WL
3834584, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2010), report and recommendation adopted by 2010
WL 3834580, at *1 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 29, 2010).
53
988 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1993).
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plea bargain, and retrial.54
In 2011, Lafler and Frye came before the Supreme Court, raising
additional issues about ineffectiveness claims with respect to plea
bargaining. The Court’s holdings in these cases make clear that prejudice
arising from counsel’s deficient performance extends beyond acceptance of
a guilty plea based on misinformation concerning the consequences of a
plea.55 As Frye indicates, prejudice can exist when a defense attorney fails
to communicate a favorable plea offer to a client who later pleads guilty to a
more serious offense.56 Alternatively, as Lafler indicates, prejudice can
arise when counsel’s erroneous beliefs about the State’s ability to establish
elements of a crime results in rejecting a plea in favor of a trial, after which
a convicted defendant receives a harsher sentence than the rejected plea
offer, even if the trial was free of constitutional error.57 In Frye, the
Supreme Court took upon itself the challenge of determining the duties of
defense counsel,58 and in Lafler the Court prescribed appropriate remedies
when counsel fails to perform said duties in the course of plea
negotiations.59 The following Sections address each case in turn.
E. LAFLER V. COOPER

After shooting a woman in the hip, abdomen, and buttock, Anthony
Cooper was charged with assault with intent to murder, along with three
other charges.60 The prosecution offered to dismiss two of the charges,
recommending a fifty-one- to eighty-five-month sentence in exchange for a
guilty plea.61 Cooper, who had been charged as a habitual offender,
admitted guilt and expressed his willingness to accept the plea.62 Counsel
dissuaded him from doing so, believing that the government could not
establish intent to murder.63 The case went to trial, and Cooper was
convicted and sentenced to the mandatory minimum of 185 to 360 months’

54
David A. Perez, Note, Deal or No Deal? Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1535 (2011).
55
See generally Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52 (1985).
56
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1411 (2012). In Frye’s case, prosecutors offered to
reduce a felony charge to a misdemeanor. Id. at 1404.
57
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390 (2012).
58
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
59
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391.
60
Id. at 1383.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.

2014]

CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE

467

imprisonment.64
The state court denied Cooper’s appeal, but the district court granted a
writ for habeas corpus relief, which the Sixth Circuit later affirmed. 65 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari.66
In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy held that when ineffective
assistance results in a rejected plea offer and conviction at trial, the
appropriate remedy is not the fair trial that the defendant subsequently
received, but instead, a hearing to determine whether the defendant would
have accepted the plea if not for ineffective counsel.67 After such a hearing,
the trial court’s options include resentencing based on the conviction at trial
or reopening the plea offer, depending on the circumstances of the case.68
Rather than the district court’s chosen remedy of specific performance, the
Court ordered the State to reoffer the plea, leaving the questions of
appropriate sentencing and convictions to the trial court.69 The Court noted
that sentences after trial tend to be more severe than those pursuant to plea
bargains, as was the case in Lafler.70 Unlike instances where a subsequent
fair trial cured any defects resulting from defective performance of defense
counsel, the injury to the defendant resulted from taking the case to trial.71
During oral argument, the Justices disagreed as to the nature of the
prejudice that Cooper suffered as a result of his attorney’s deficient
performance.72 In support of his prejudice claim, Cooper argued that his
sentence was three times as long as the sentence that he would have
received had he entered the offered guilty plea.73 He did receive a trial by
jury after invoking his constitutional right to a trial, however, and the trial
itself was not tainted by constitutional error.74
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief
Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas, revived this point and
64

Id.
Id. at 1383–84.
66
Id. at 1384, 1376.
67
Id. at 1389 (“In this situation [when charges that would have been admitted as part of a
plea bargain are the same charges the defendant is convicted of at trial] the court may
conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant has shown a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s errors he would have accepted the plea.”).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 1391.
70
Id. at 1387 (“The expected post-trial sentence is imposed in only a few percent of
cases. It is like the sticker price for cars: only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view
full price as the norm and anything less a bargain.” (quoting Bibas, supra note 47, at 1138)).
71
Id. at 1386.
72
Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, 22, 23, Lafler, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (No. 10-209).
73
Id. at 7–8.
74
Id. at 13–14.
65
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criticized the majority for bringing plea-bargaining law under the banner of
criminal procedure, thereby extending constitutional protections beyond the
scope of the Sixth Amendment and “elevat[ing] plea bargaining from a
necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.”75 In keeping with his
commitment to originalism, Justice Scalia emphasized the trial by jury as
the “gold standard of American justice.”76 Justice Scalia suggested that the
majority’s holding would open a new realm of constitutional law.77 This
new “boutique of constitutional jurisprudence” would, in turn, result in
further constitutional litigation, including litigation about the
constitutionality of prosecutorial decisions.78
However, the majority’s position was much closer to Justice Elena
Kagan’s position during oral argument. Justice Kagan pointed out that the
Court has recognized plea bargaining as a critical stage “because about 98
percent of the action of the criminal justice system occurs in plea
bargaining.”79 Thus, depriving a defendant of effective assistance of
counsel at that stage, where the vast majority of the action takes place,
would be incompatible with the Sixth Amendment.80
F. MISSOURI V. FRYE

On the same day that it issued Lafler, the Supreme Court also ruled on
Missouri v. Frye, another plea-bargaining case. Galin Frye was charged
with driving with a revoked license. He had been convicted of the same
crime three times before.81 On account of these previous convictions,
Frye’s charge amounted to a Class D felony, with a maximum penalty of
four years in prison.82 Prosecutors presented two offers to Frye’s attorney.
The first offer involved a guilty plea to the felony charge and a
recommended sentence of three years, while the second offer reduced the
charge to a misdemeanor and recommended a ninety-day sentence.83 Frye’s
attorney communicated neither offer to him, and Frye was again arrested for
driving with a suspended license before his preliminary hearing, two days
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Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1398.
77
Id.; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1496 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Adding to counsel’s duties an obligation to advise about a conviction’s collateral
consequences has no logical stopping point.”).
78
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392.
79
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 72, at 25.
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Id.
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Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012).
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after the offers expired.84 Frye later pleaded guilty, without any agreement,
and was sentenced to three years in prison.85 In his appeal for
postconviction relief, Frye alleged that his attorney’s failure to inform him
of the misdemeanor plea offer, which he would have accepted, amounted to
ineffective assistance of counsel.86 Frye’s claim, denied in state court, was
reversed on appeal, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
an appropriate remedy.87
Again writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that, “as a
general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers
from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be
favorable to the accused.”88 Such terms and conditions “may result in a
lesser sentence, a conviction on lesser charges, or both.”89 Frye’s counsel’s
failure to do so fell below Strickland’s objective standard and caused
substantial prejudice to the defendant, who showed a reasonable probability
that he would have accepted the offer on the basis of his guilty plea to the
felony charge.90 The Supreme Court then remanded the case to the
Missouri Court of Appeals to determine whether the prosecution would
have adhered to the offer, with resentencing to possibly follow.91 In Frye,
as in Lafler, the Court recognized that without extending Sixth Amendment
protection to the plea-bargaining process, “[c]riminal procedure thus
becomes a binary on/off switch, fully enforced at jury trials but simply
inapplicable in plea bargaining.”92
Again, Justice Scalia dissented, making the point that although Lafler’s
conviction resulted from a jury trial, Frye’s conviction was based on his
plea and the admission of guilt that accompanied it.93 Justice Scalia again
raised concerns about applying Sixth Amendment protections to the pleabargaining process. While the ineffectiveness in Frye’s case was clear, he
commented, it would not be so clear in other cases, especially given that
negotiation is often a matter of an attorney’s personal style.94 In addition,
Justice Samuel Alito raised the concern that the sort of prejudice resulting
in Frye, where failure to communicate a misdemeanor plea offer resulted in
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id.
Id. at 1405.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1408.
Id.
Id. at 1410–11.
Id.
Bibas, supra note 47, at 1122.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
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a guilty plea to a felony, would always exist when defendants rejected
favorable deals and judges imposed much harsher sentences after trial.95 If
prejudice would not be difficult to show, something more than a reasonable
probability would be required to maintain Strickland’s high bar.96
II. DISCUSSION
The dissents in Frye and Lafler raised the question as to whether these
cases opened the door for a slew of new habeas petitions, filed by
defendants who argue that they would have accepted favorable plea offers
had their attorneys not persuaded them to take their cases to trial. While
insufficient time has elapsed to provide the requisite empirical data to
determine whether such a result has materialized, the Court confronted a
similar question in Padilla; it determined that lower courts had not been
overburdened by habeas filings from defendants who pleaded guilty since
Hill endorsed such petitions.97 The Court in Padilla noted that as of 2003,
pleas accounted for 95% of all convictions98 and 30% of all habeas
petitions, with the other 70% of habeas petitions filed by those 5% of
defendants who took their cases to trial and were convicted.99 Nonetheless,
Justice Scalia’s Lafler dissent raised a more significant concern. Justice
Scalia noted that the Lafler and Frye majorities only touched upon two
possible forms of counsels’ incompetence in plea bargaining and warned
that additional litigation would follow, potentially encompassing the
constitutionality of prosecutorial practices.100
Supreme Court jurisprudence to date has provided remedies intended
to safeguard the rights of the criminal defendant who has been prejudiced
by ineffective counsel, indirectly regulating defense attorneys’ practices.101
95

Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (No. 10-444).
Id. at 40.
97
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct 1473, 1485 (2010).
98
Id. (citing U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 418 tbl.5.17, 450 tbl.5.46 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen
Maguire eds., 2005) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS]).
99
Id. (citing VICTOR E. FLANGO ET AL., HABEAS CORPUS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
36–38 (1994)). The Court noted that Flango demonstrated how “5% of defendants whose
conviction was the result of a trial account for approximately 70% of the habeas petitions
filed.” Id. at 1485 n.14.
100
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1392 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For arguments
supporting Justice Scalia’s claim, see, for example, Aaron K. Friess, Note, Soothsaying With
a Foggy Crystal Ball: A Critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Remedy for Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel When a Criminal Defendant Rejects a Plea Bargain, 52 WASHBURN
L.J. 147, 168–69 n.173–74 (2012).
101
See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012); Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391;
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486; Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). Similarly, pleabargaining literature focuses on the role of defense attorneys in the bargaining process. See
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In its review of guilty pleas, the Supreme Court has focused attention
on the information available to defendants so as to ensure that enough was
present for them to knowingly and voluntarily waive their procedural
rights.102 Competent defense counsel has been the one substantial safeguard
that has undergirded the Court’s decisionmaking, and plea-bargaining
jurisprudence has focused on ensuring that defense attorneys provide advice
that meets this standard.103 However, if Justice Scalia’s prediction is
credible, the Court is likely to broaden its scope of inquiry in pleabargaining cases. One reason comes from the systemic impediments to
effective counsel, which reinforce plea bargaining as a standard practice,
while shifting negotiations from a defendant’s guilt or innocence to the
most acceptable sentence for disposing his case.
A. CASELOADS AS A SYSTEMIC IMPEDIMENT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

Both prosecutors and public defenders currently face caseloads far
beyond any attorney’s ability to competently manage.104 The National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals set a
guideline of no more than 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, 200 juvenile
cases, 200 mental health cases, or 25 appeals in a year.105 However, public
defender caseloads rarely abide by these guidelines.106 Few offices have
“enforceable, maximum caseload standards,” and those that do often exceed
them.107
The Knox County Public Defender’s Community Law Office in
Tennessee, for instance, recently sought judicial relief by having a court
suspend its appointment to cases in misdemeanor court, when four attorneys
were responsible for 3,500 cases in a year.108 As the Public Defender
testified, initial thirty-minute interviews with clients alone consumed an

generally Albert Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J.
1179 (1975); Moriarty & Main, supra note 7.
102
See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 186 (2005); United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S.
622, 629–30 (2002); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 626 (1998); Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 242–44 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466–67 (1969).
103
Bibas, supra note 47, at 1126.
104
See Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s Guarding the Henhouse? How the American Prosecutor
Came to Devour Those He Is Sworn to Protect, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 513, 538 (2012).
105
AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.19 (2002).
106
See NORMAN LEFSTEIN & ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG, NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL
COMM., CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 65–70 (2009).
107
Id. at 67.
108
Transcript of Proceedings at 5, 21, In re Petition of Knox Cnty. Pub. Defender (June
10, 2008), available at http://goo.gl/EE2MKB.
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entire week of their attorneys’ time, leaving no time to investigate, contact
officers, or interview witnesses in advance of trials.109 Even with attorneys
arriving at the office early, working weekends and holidays, and not taking
their annual leave, these caseloads were compromising their abilities to
provide effective representation.110
Felony attorneys also took on
misdemeanor cases, with one public defender stating through an affidavit
that she represented clients in approximately 297 cases, including 101
felonies, 186 misdemeanors, and 10 probation violations.111 Eight months
after the hearing, the Tennessee General Sessions Court denied relief,
finding that while such caseloads “exceed[ed] national criminal justice
standards and goals,” they were not at “such a level as to violate the right to
competent counsel under either the United States Constitution or the
Constitution of Tennessee.”112
Knox County’s public defenders are not alone. Public defenders in
Minnesota averaged 900 cases a year in 2003,113 and the two attorneys
assigned to the juvenile division in Clark County, Nevada, had caseloads of
nearly 1,500 clients.114 When public defenders in a Louisiana parish, with
caseloads of 472 clients apiece, began refusing to take on new clients on
account of their existing caseloads, a judge turned to the phone book,
calling attorneys and appointing them as counsel for indigent defendants.115
Forty years after Gideon v. Wainwright,116 which guaranteed the right to
counsel,117 an American Bar Association (ABA) report recognized the
widespread inadequacy of representation for indigent defendants, and
among other measures, recommended that indigent defense programs cease
taking new cases when their attorneys’ caseloads precluded them from
providing quality representation.118 Minnesota’s chief public defender went
so far as to file suit in state court, arguing that the systems in place deprived
clients of effective assistance of counsel by underfunding public defense
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Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 31–32, 44.
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NORMAN LEFSTEIN, AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 170
(2011).
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Id. at 171 (citation omitted).
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Id. at 1055.
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Id. at 344.
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AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S
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systems and failing to enforce recommended caseload limits.119 This and
other similar suits filed by public defenders in state courts have been largely
unsuccessful to date, however, with federal courts either denying or
declining to hear them on appeal.120 While litigation has yet to successfully
limit the caseloads of defense counsel for the indigent, these lawsuits have
raised awareness through media coverage, and some offices have been able
to present empirical data concerning their needs when arguing for increased
funding.121
Like public defenders, prosecutors are just as overburdened by their
caseloads. For instance, junior prosecutors in Houston have approximately
500 open cases at any time during a year, during which time each attorney
is responsible for handling 1,500.122 The average felony prosecutor in
Chicago handles fewer cases than do these prosecutors, but her caseload
still amounts to 300 open cases at once and 800 to 1,000 cases per year.123
While Las Vegas had 90 prosecutors in 2009, each prosecutor was still
responsible for nearly 800 cases.124 If prosecutorial caseloads were
measured by standards similar to those recommended for public defenders,
many prosecutors would well exceed those standards.125
119

Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
See Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 427, 440, 470–71 (2009). The Florida Supreme Court recently held
that the Miami-Dade County Public Defender could move to withdraw from cases en masse.
Pub. Defender v. Florida, 115 So.3d 261, 274 (Fla. 2013). The Public Defender had
implemented a number of measures to reduce excessive caseloads, but an office-wide
problem remained as to effective representation. Id. The Florida Supreme Court then
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See Indigent Defense Studies, SPANGENBERG GRP.,
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oversee and fund its public defender system, the state legislature commissioned a
Spangenberg study to analyze caseloads and make recommendations. Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d
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defense system and make recommendations, it commissioned a Spangenberg report. See
State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 789 n.8 (1993).
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prosecutors. Josh Bowers, Physician, Heal Thyself: Discretion and the Problem of
Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads, A Response to Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger,
106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 143, 145 (2011). With those caveats in mind, Bowers notes
120

474

MIKE WORK

[Vol. 104

Overburdened prosecutors, relying heavily upon plea bargaining, may
benefit defendants, who are offered more favorable sentences than might be
awarded at trial.126 However, this arguable benefit is accompanied by a
number of harmful effects on defendants, victims, and the public at large.
The public can be particularly impacted when the factually guilty receive
excessive lenience because of prosecutors’ excessive caseloads.127 In
particular, when prosecutors lack the time and resources to properly
investigate cases and interview witnesses, their sentencing
recommendations could be based on preliminary scans of the police reports
and the criminal records of the accused, without consideration of potentially
exculpatory evidence, defenses, and mitigating factors. Plea offers attached
to deadlines that preclude investigation are transparent in their purpose to
alleviate attorneys’ caseloads, rather than address the specific facts of a
particular charged offense.
In their study on the impact of excessive prosecutorial caseloads,
Adam Gershowitz and Laura Killinger recommend increased funding for
both prosecutors and attorneys for indigent defendants128 (whose chronic
underfunding is well-documented).129 Allocating additional funds that
provide sufficient time and resources for investigation would allow
prosecutors to make clearer distinctions within the defendant pool and to
make offers on this basis, which would address some of the specific effects
of excessive caseloads mentioned above. While additional financial
resources could aid in resolving some of the problems associated with
caseload management, simply increasing the resources available to
prosecutors and defense attorneys does not address the asymmetry of the
plea-bargaining process. This asymmetry follows from the additional tools
that prosecutors have to handle their caseload; specifically, prosecutorial
discretion allows the State to pursue or dismiss charges, irrespective of the
defense’s posture. For this reason, further litigation focused on reviewing

that the counties mentioned above, as well as those encompassing Miami, Dallas, and Fort
Lauderdale, exceed the suggested measure of excessiveness, which allows for the inference
that Gerschowitz and Killinger “have identified a genuine problem that, at a minimum,
affects hundreds of thousands of criminal cases each year.” Id.
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Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 11, at 279–80.
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Id. at 295.
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Id. at 265.
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See generally, e.g., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 118; Backus & Marcus,
supra note 14; Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of
Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 783; Drinan, supra note 120; Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded
Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 377–94
(1995); Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1734–35 (2005).
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prosecutorial practices will be a necessary complement to legislative
reforms geared at providing additional financial resources to attorneys in
the criminal legal system.
B. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE FORCES THAT SUBVERT IT

Some scholars have argued that plea bargaining is best explained by a
contractual metaphor insofar as it involves a bargained-for exchange with
both parties trading risk for something of value.130 However, because
prosecutors have both significant duties to the public and the ability to
exercise wide-ranging discretion, the metaphor cannot hold, for the plea
agreements are not at all like the bilateral agreements between two parties
negotiating a business deal.131 Namely, the defendant faces a potential loss
of liberty, while the government has a responsibility to victims and to the
public that is very different from a private attorney’s duty to corporate
clients and, by proxy, their shareholders.132 As agents of the U.S.
government, prosecutors have a duty not to earn a profit for their clients but
instead to ensure that justice be done and “that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer.”133 In achieving this goal, the prosecutor “may strike hard
blows, [but] he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”134 The
seminal case Brady v. Maryland also calls attention to the importance of
prosecutors ensuring due process, stating that “[s]ociety wins not only when
the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”135
Brady even cites an inscription within the Department of Justice that reads,
“‘The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in
the courts.’”136 In the context of plea bargaining, Brady can be considered
an obligation to do justice by disclosing information favorable to the
defense prior to presenting a plea offer, which would help the accused

130
See generally Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101
YALE L.J. 1909 (1992) (evaluating arguments against plea bargaining through the lenses of
classical contract and bargain theory, and arguing that contract reasoning is better suited than
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2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 119 (1997); Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1987–91.
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evaluate the proposed offer.137 Such a scenario is not as far-fetched as it
might sound, for the Supreme Court has recognized that Brady “represents
a limited departure from a pure adversary model” by “requiring the
prosecutor to assist the defense in making its case.”138
1. External Institutional Pressures
However, these ideals about justice can be subverted by systemic
pressures and by external forces that have left prosecutors with both more
cases than they can effectively handle and an expanded set of tools for
obtaining convictions. For instance, from the 1970s to the 1990s,
politicians from both parties made promises to be tough on crime, with
media portrayals propelling crime to the top of the domestic agenda in the
1980s and 1990s.139
The 1980s and 1990s were marked by what scholars have termed
overcriminalization, which created an additional class of criminal offenses
with significant consequences for the accused.140 In the wake of the socalled War on Drugs, a more punitive criminal justice system emerged, as
evidenced by life sentences for recidivism and mandatory minimum
sentences that eliminated judicial discretion and transferred it to
prosecutors.141 The oft-criticized Federal Sentencing Guidelines were also
issued in this era.142
The resulting dilemma facing prosecutors in this context could be
summarized as follows:
The prosecutor in this new era thus has a difficult choice: to refuse to prosecute more
cases than the system can handle justly in the face of pressure to do otherwise or to
bring cases without regard for resources in order to satisfy society’s increasingly
punitive appetite, regardless of the fact that it will jeopardize the protections that
define justice.143

This is a particularly significant challenge for those prosecutors who seek
reelection or aspire to higher offices within the political system and do not
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want to be perceived or portrayed as soft on crime.144
2. Institutional Pressures
In addition to these external pressures, prosecutors also face internal
institutional pressures related to the organizational culture of their offices.
Ronald Wright and Kay Levine point to the ways in which the “unwritten
social rules, norms and language” of a prosecutorial office, communicated
informally to newer attorneys, “do more than simply define how a
prosecutor acts; they define who a prosecutor is.”145
Also within the prosecutorial context, John Rapping identifies four
values that contribute to an organizational culture that breeds injustice,
compromises the ethical obligations of even the most well-intentioned
prosecutors and leads them to use the tools at their disposal to force plea
bargains.146 These four values are: (1) prioritizing convictions, (2)
dehumanizing the accused, (3) disregarding procedural protections that
stand in the way of securing convictions, and (4) viewing defense attorneys
as obstacles to justice.147 When incentives for prosecuting attorneys’ career
advancement are tied to conviction rates and the vast majority of
convictions come from pleas, prosecutors’ reasons for tailoring plea offers
to generate convictions become more readily understood.148
It is within these contexts that one can understand how practices of
overcharging and extending exploding offers have developed, as they have
become effective ways for prosecutors to meet both internal and external
expectations and more effectively manage their caseloads.149 The plea offer
has become a powerful means to effectively transfer discretion to defense
attorneys, who have significant immediate incentives for convincing
indigent clients to waive their Sixth Amendment rights and truncate due
process.150 Private defense attorneys who receive flat fees or set hourly
rates have an incentive to spend as little time as possible on a given case,
while public defenders have a limited amount of time to divide among their
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many clients.151 The following Section addresses overcharging in greater
detail.
C. OVERCHARGING AND COERCIVE PLEA BARGAINING

Overcharging, one practice that prosecutors can employ, takes two
primary forms. Vertical overcharging involves charging defendants with a
stronger variation of a form of conduct, along with a lesser version, for the
same offense.152 For instance, prosecutors can charge felonies in both the
first and the second degree, or pair felony and misdemeanor charges. As
long as both counts can be supported by the equivalent of probable cause,
which occasioned the arrest, multiple counts can stand until trial,
encompassing the bulk of the plea-bargaining process. Multiple counts thus
impact plea bargaining by encouraging defendants “to plead guilty to a
lesser offense—often to the charge that absent strategic considerations
would have been selected initially—simply to avoid risking conviction on
the higher charge.”153
The second practice, horizontal charging, involves charging defendants
with multiple distinct crimes resulting from the same conduct.154 For
instance, a prosecutor can charge “street terrorism” alongside robbery, or
charge simple battery alongside disorderly conduct.155 Overbroad criminal
statutes also make it possible to charge one act as multiple counts. Thus, a
prosecutor may charge a defendant with eight criminal counts for one action
and present the defendant with a plea offer that appears generous when the
defendant compares it to a maximum sentence that incorporates punishment
for all eight counts, which thereby exploits informational asymmetries in
the bargaining process.156
Tacking on additional counts provides
prosecutors with leverage in the plea-bargaining process and also affords a
backup at trial if the jury opts to acquit on the main charge.157 While the
ABA standard for prosecution is not to press charges that cannot be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, and Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct requires that every charge be supported by probable cause, no
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external check generally prevents prosecutors from charging offenses at a
disproportionately high level with respect to the conduct at issue.158 While
prosecutorial discretion as to what charges to file does provide law
enforcement personnel with additional time to investigate, it also allows
prosecutors to begin the plea-negotiating process from a stronger position
than they would do otherwise.159
Although ethical codes discourage prosecutors from overcharging, it is
unclear how the existence of the codes affects prosecutorial discretion
without additional checks, such as internal review boards and external
audits of charging decisions, apart from those that take place in grand jury
proceedings.160 Overcharging sets parameters for negotiation that favor the
prosecution, giving the prosecution the additional leverage to threaten
harsher sentences than the offenses warrant at trial. The grand jury,
intended to be a “protector of citizens against arbitrary and oppressive
government action,” also strongly favors the prosecution.161 The Supreme
Court has held that there is no requirement to disclose exculpatory evidence
to grand juries, while state courts are split on the question.162 In addition, a
suspect called before the grand jury for questioning cannot insist that
counsel be present in the grand jury room.163 With defense counsel absent
from the proceedings, the prosecution controls the information presented to
the grand jury and may obtain indictments on the basis of hearsay evidence
that will be inadmissible at trial.164
Within these parameters, prosecutors have ample incentive to
overcharge when trial would be inefficient and when they believe the
defendants are guilty of one of the charged offenses.165 Prosecutors can
obtain leverage by overcharging, which opens the door for coercive
158
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L. REV. 2187, 2188–89 (2010).
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United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
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United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). For a review of the states that
give prosecutors broad, limited, or no duty to present exculpatory evidence to grand juries,
see generally Sharon N. Humble, Annotation, Duty of Prosecutor to Present Exculpatory
Evidence to State Grand Jury, 49 A.L.R. 639 (1997) (analyzing and categorizing state cases
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pleas.166 Threats of additional charges based on habitual offender laws
weaken defense counsels’ negotiating position,167 particularly when these
charges carry mandatory minimum sentences that minimize judicial
discretion in sentencing. In such circumstances, even defendants with
counsel are more likely to accept guilty pleas, in light of the risks of
conviction at trial and the resultant sentencing penalties.168
D. DEFENSE RESPONSES TO THE EVOLVING PLEA MARKET

Professor Stephanos Bibas alludes to the role that charging decisions
and information asymmetries play in setting the parameters of plea
negotiations, as well as to the defendants’ need for information in
evaluating plea offers.169 The Frye and Lafler opinions echo Bibas’s
statement:
Plea bargaining is thus not an esoteric corner of the market reserved for indisputably
guilty defendants who should be happy to receive any lower sentences as a matter of
grace. It is the market, and defendants need competent advice about the facets and
consequences of the transaction before they agree to a deal.170

In a separate piece, Bibas explains the fallacies of considering trials to
be the norm and of basing sentencing assessments upon this mistaken
assumption.171 A charging standard of probable cause, overbroad and
overlapping criminal statutes, and mandatory minimum sentences work in
combination to inflate the potential sentence so much that the baseline
sentence after a plea appears to be a discount.172 In this situation, “[w]hen
prosecutors threaten inflated post-trial sentences to induce pleas, defendants
are less free to test their guilt at trial. Defendants may be better off if they
play the game well but much worse off if they do not.”173
Given the prevalence of plea bargaining, the presence of overcharging,
and the sentence penalties incurred after trial, it can plausibly be argued
that, to provide effective assistance, defense attorneys must be familiar with
a given prosecutorial office’s charging patterns and be able to discern the
distinctions between the sticker price and the going rate.174 Effective
166
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advocates will not just prevent convictions of the innocent, but they will
also mitigate punitive damages imposed against the guilty through charge
enhancement and sentencing.175
In addition to becoming attuned to the plea-deal market, defense
counsel must fulfill their baseline responsibilities of assessing the facts of
cases, clients’ individualized life circumstances, and the likelihood of
convictions at trial to provide the accused with enough information to make
informed decisions about the offered pleas. While the sheer volume of
cases that attorneys for indigent defendants handle weighs against their
ability to provide effective counsel, the problem is compounded by another
tool at prosecutors’ disposal: exploding offers. Exploding offers combine
guilty pleas to lesser charges with narrow windows of time before the offers
expire. Those windows can be as short as the several hours between the
beginning and end of an arraignment calendar.176 These offers put defense
attorneys, who have a minimal amount of time to investigate cases, in the
position of preparing Strickland claims against themselves while advising
defendants on the merits of the pleas.177 Even in misdemeanor cases, this
practice pervades.178 As Margaret Colgate Love, liaison to the ABA
Standards Committee from the National Legal Aid and Defender
Organization, comments:
The facts of life in busy misdemeanor courts make a mockery of the current ABA
Standard warning that defense counsel should “under no circumstances . . .
recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless appropriate investigation and
study of the case has been completed.” At the same time, the severity of the penalties
to which even misdemeanants are now exposed lends constitutional force to policy
arguments that clients charged with minor crimes should not be compelled to plead as
a condition of release. If “prevailing professional norms” forbid a lawyer to advise a
client to plead at first appearance before adequate investigation and counseling can
take place, any such plea would be entered in the absence of genuine defense
representation, and would thus be vulnerable to constitutional challenge. It is safe to
predict that an insistence on a genuine opportunity for counseling in light of the
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severity of potential collateral consequences will result either in fewer pleas or, in
time, fewer consequences.179

Courts have long recognized that criminal defendants face pressure to
plead guilty even when they are innocent and have focused their attention
on preventing prosecutors from both overtly coercing defendants into
making pleas and convicting the factually innocent.180 At the federal level,
courts have taken initial steps to minimize the dangers of coercing guilty
pleas from innocent defendants by requiring judicial determinations that the
pleas rest upon factual bases.181 Overcharging has primarily been evaluated
within the academy, however, and not in the court system. A number of
potential solutions have been suggested and are summarized below.182
E. POTENTIAL PLEA-BARGAINING REFORMS

In light of the structural imbalances within the criminal legal system
and the prevalence of plea bargaining, a number of scholars have presented
proposals to reform the process. At one end of the spectrum, scholars have
called for the abolition of plea bargaining, which is not permitted in Japan
and is not relied upon in much of continental Europe.183 Such a radical
change does not appear likely to happen any time soon.184 Less radical
reform proposals call for changing the structure of the plea bargaining
system and encouraging sentence bargaining, where bargaining is reserved
for the sentence, not the charge.185 Professor Oren Gazal-Ayal has
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proposed a partial ban on plea bargaining.186 In a system with such a ban,
judges could identify weaker cases because of the significant concessions
prosecutors offered in exchange for guilty pleas and could prohibit plea
bargains in those cases.187 This would effectively force the state to drop
charges and allocate its trial resources to stronger cases.188
Bibas attempts to minimize information asymmetry by insisting on
open discovery during plea negotiations so that defense counsel can better
evaluate the government’s case and recognize overcharging.189 Pleas would
still predominate, but defense counsel would begin in relatively stronger
positions to negotiate and could more effectively advise their clients earlier
in the process. Furthermore, the government’s interest in securing pleas
from factually guilty defendants would not be compromised if prosecutors
had to disclose exculpatory evidence earlier in the process.190 However, as
mentioned above, issues of funding and workload would need to be
addressed so as to ensure that prosecutors actually review such evidence
and that inadvertent Brady violations, in which prosecutors withhold
potentially exculpatory evidence, would not occur.191
In contrast to Bibas’s proposal to open discovery and rely upon
defense counsel’s instincts to recognize overcharged cases, Professor
Daniel Medwed suggests that a higher charging standard would force
prosecutors to charge cases accordingly.192 Such a change would need to be
accompanied by a mechanism for oversight, like an internal charging
review board that would encourage critical reflection about the cases.193
Medwed recognizes the practical problems with establishing such an
oversight team, given the proliferation of cases that many prosecutorial
offices face.194 He suggests that the board would not review all cases but
would focus upon those with the most significant risks of wrongful
convictions.195
Common characteristics associated with wrongful
186
See generally Gazal-Ayal, supra note 6 (arguing that the prevalence of plea
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convictions include “eyewitness misidentifications, false confessions,
jailhouse informants, police and prosecutorial misconduct, use of dubious
forensic science, and ineffective assistance of defense counsel.”196 While
Medwed’s concern is with wrongfully convicting the innocent, scholars
who have raised questions about coercive pleas in general echo his cry for
prosecutorial oversight.197 Such oversight could take the form of an
oversight body reviewing notations in prosecutors’ files made when they
dropped original charges after accepting pleas, requiring written plea offers
subject to supervisory review and approval, employing internal regulation
through multiple-source feedback loops that control the reward and
promotion systems, or using systematic audits from internal oversight
teams.198 As H. Mitchell Caldwell observes, these approaches all raise
questions about how they could induce voluntary compliance, absent
increased funding and some form of external oversight, which Caldwell
supports.199
Each of these reform schemes has its merits, and a comprehensive
approach that brings together their collective strengths would begin to
address overcharging. Without judicial prompting and an effective means
of ensuring compliance, however, it is unlikely that any substantial reforms
to the plea process will be implemented.
By examining the plea-bargaining process in both Frye and Lafler and
bringing it under the critical stage doctrine, the Supreme Court has cleared a
pathway for courts to evaluate practices associated with plea bargaining.
The remainder of this Comment examines the potential direct effects of
these holdings on defense attorneys and prosecutors and predicts how future
litigation could result in specific reforms within the plea-bargaining
process.
III. THE AFTERMATH OF FRYE AND LAFLER
The holdings in Frye and Lafler reiterate defense attorneys’ existing
ethical responsibilities to communicate to clients the existence of plea offers
and assess the offers’ relative merits so that the clients’ decisions to accept
or to decline pleas are informed and voluntary. After Frye and Lafler,
196
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defense attorneys could become more fastidious in advising clients of plea
offers in a timely fashion and in encouraging them to take those offers that
appear favorable. This result is particularly likely for attorneys mindful of
the possibility that the failure to persuade clients to plead guilty could result
in ineffectiveness claims on appeal. On the contrary, defense attorneys who
are relatively unconcerned with the possibility of Strickland claims or who
have come to accept those claims as inevitable consequences of their field
of practice could become more cavalier in their approaches to the question
of trial. Such attorneys might then advise clients to take cases to trial when
they face plea offers that are acceptable but not ideal. Under Frye and
Lafler, the remedy for heightened sentences following post-trial convictions
would be the sentences offered during plea bargaining, while the potential
rewards for taking the cases to trial would be acquittals.
As for prosecutors, Frye and Lafler’s remedy for successful Strickland
claims could result in them only making offers that they are willing to live
with. As they decide what offers to make, they will bear in mind that
successful Strickland claims based on bargains that are not communicated
to the accused could result in reopened plea offers, rather than new trials.
This remedy could lead prosecutors to make offers that are less favorable
for defendants and could lead to a harsher sentencing climate in general.
If the root causes of our overcrowded criminal justice system are not
addressed, such as the funding issues that plague both district attorneys and
public defenders, then defendants and defense counsel could effectively
strike by refusing to accept plea offers on those terms.200 Such actions
would force prosecutors to either issue more lenient offers or take
additional cases to trial. The practice of overcharging, as well as the
purposes it serves in expediently disposing of cases through pleas, could
then come into the Supreme Court’s purview. The Court has not yet
directly confronted overcharging, but the holdings in Padilla, Frye, and
Lafler make it more likely that it will do so in the future.201
Prosecutorial discretion is unlikely to be successfully challenged,
particularly with respect to the specific charges that prosecutors bring
against defendants, as that practice is a recognized characteristic of
prosecution. However, prosecutors’ practice of extending exploding offers
could be curtailed by future litigants, whose appointed counsel may be
200
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2012), at SR5.
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unable to investigate the charges and provide effective representation in the
span of a few hours. If such short-term offers were ruled unconstitutional
in certain types of cases—such as those involving mandatory minimum
sentences, because they necessarily involve ineffective assistance of
counsel—the plea-bargaining landscape would be altered. Such a change
would most closely resemble scholarly proposals that suggest forbidding
plea agreements at first appearances for serious felonies.202 Defendants’
first appearances would be followed by a mandatory cooling-off period,
which would allow defendants to rationally consider plea offers and would
serve as a hedge against inevitable Strickland claims.203 Some public
defender offices even now refuse to plead clients out at first appearances,
whether for felonies or misdemeanors, because they recognize the pressure
to plead and the prevalence of plea agreements at first appearances.204 By
providing constitutional support for these practices and affirmatively stating
that a contrary rule forces ineffective representation of counsel, judges
could begin to further regulate plea bargaining without making wholesale
changes that curtail prosecutorial discretion.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s acknowledgement in Frye and Lafler that plea
bargaining is the primary way that the criminal justice system functions
leaves room for additional constitutional litigation concerning pleabargaining practices. While the dissents raised the specter of litigation that
would challenge prosecutorial practices and discretion, a wholesale
challenge to prosecutorial discretion is unlikely to succeed; as a recognized
characteristic of prosecution, prosecutorial discretion is even more
entrenched in the legal system than plea bargaining. However, one possible
plea-bargaining reform could result through Strickland challenges and
would be consistent with scholarly recommendations and the practices of
defense attorneys who find it impossible to provide effective counsel when
plea offers have short expiration dates. A strategically filed Strickland
petition in a case in which a plea agreement was only available to the
defendant for hours at the first appearance could turn the court’s eyes to a
practice that does more to clear cases from the docket than to secure justice.
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In light of the Supreme Court’s recent holdings, if such a case reached
the Court, it would be an easy case, along the lines of Frye and Lafler. As
in those cases, the Court could issue a ruling reinstating the plea offered at
first appearance, along with a broader holding that such offers, attached to
same-day deadlines, are unconstitutional. If the Court altered the pleabargaining landscape and required a minimum period of time for initial
offers to remain open, two possible outcomes emerge. First, prosecutors
could be forced to extend the deadlines for initial offers to allow for proper
investigation and effective counsel. Another possibility is that prosecutors
could no longer offer pleas at first appearances. Attorneys on both sides
could then have additional time to investigate their cases and come to the
negotiating table with a better understanding of the facts at issue. Either
one of these outcomes would increase the likelihood that the pleabargaining process would result in resolutions that do justice for all parties
involved and ensure that the promises of Brady are kept.
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